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ABSTRACT: 
Memory remanence in SRAMs and DRAMs is usually exploited through cold-boot attacks 
and the targets are the main memory and the L2 cache memory. Hence, a sudden power 
shutdown may give an attacker the opportunity to download the contents of the memory 
and extract critical data.  
Side-channel attacks such as differential power or differential electromagnetic analysis 
have proven to be very effective against memory security. Furthermore, blending cold-boot 
attacks with DPA or DEMA can overpower even a high-level of security in cache or main 
memories. In this scope, data scrambling techniques have been explored and employed to 
improve the security, with a minor penalty in performance. Enforcing security techniques 
and methods in cache memories is risky because any substantial reduction in the cache 
memory speed might be devastating to the CPU, which is why the performance penalty 
must be minimal. 
In this paper, we introduce an improved scrambling technique which uses random masking 
of the scrambling vector and it is designed to protect cache memories against cold-boot and 
differential power or electromagnetic attacks.  
The technique is analyzed in terms of area, power and speed, while the level of security is 
evaluated through adversary models and simulated attacks.  
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